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The Perception of Non-Perception:
Lessons for Art Education with Downcast Eyes
(Part One: Trompe-L’Oeil and the
Question of Radical Evil)

jan jagodzinski

Pretext
The Roman historian Pliny recounts a story that ocurred during
Periclean Athens. I will utilize this story, as a trope to undertake
an interrogation of perception as it is commonly understood and
currently practiced by art educators in schools. In order to deconstruct
vision/blindness, or the perception/non-perception binary, I have
examined the psychoanalytic paradigm of Jacques Lacan. His current
interpreters provided the conceptual tools for such an undertaking.
Given that the question of representation has become a key sign-post
of postmodernism, art educators must conceptualize a trajectory for
itself in the 21st century.
Part One of such a trajectory questions the very foundations of the
Western Eye. Its heyday of Cartesian perspectivism has now evolved
into the postmodern simulacrum which purports to represent the
phantasmagoric spectacle, that Jean Baudrillard called the “hyperreal”
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world of simulations where the sign of the image refers only to itself in a
system of differences. Perception has been metaphorically characterized
as a “corridor of mirrors, ” a mise en abyme effect of endless reflection
(Carroll, 1987). The claims to a multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival
knowledge of all phenomenon paradoxically strengthens the status
of an enucleated eye despite the waning of a transcendental gaze. In
Part One, I question the validity of the enucleated eye by raising the
“spectre” of desire which can’t be “seen.” I suggest that this “other”
of vision is introduced into the field of vision by the function of the
gaze as Lacan developed it in his XI Seminar (1979). He argued that the
field of vision is essentially organized around what cannot be seen and
what appears as a “screen” or a “stain,” a “spot.” Given such a stance,
vision in the postmodern age now becomes complicated by an ethics
of blindness (cf. Emmanuel Levinas) and sublimity (cf. Jean-François
Lyotard). I will explore the implications of this “blind spot” for art
education by introducing the question of “radical or diabolical evil;” i.e.,
the possibility that the human will is capable not simply of opposing
the moral law, but making this opposition the very motive of human
action. Such a possibility, for example, is paradigmatically illustrated by
Oliver Stone’s film Natural Born Killers which specularizes its excesses
(Hamsher, Murphy, Townstead, & Stone, 1994). Given the prevalence
of this “dark God,” what are art educators to make of postmodern evil?
Part One responds to this question through “five lessons” that are meant
to lay the ground work for further analysis (i.e., a sequel—Part Two)
which will extend this conversation to the simulacra world of electronic
technology and the digitalized image in a more direct manner.1

Lesson One: Perception as (Mis)perception
Deception

and

There is a famous story told by Pliny about the quest of the

1
This short essay is the beginning of a larger project which explores the
question of art, art education and ethics from a decidedly Lacanian psychoanalytic
point of view begun some ten years ago (see jagodzinski, 1996). Part 2, which
deals with the question of the deep structures of perception and simulacra of
digitalized images has been developed for “Untold Stories about Perception”
an art education symposium honoring the work of Ron N. MacGregor. The
notion of “downcast eyes” in the title comes from Jay (1993).
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artist to represent reality. One day Zeuxis and Parrhasius
had a painting contest to determine who could best paint
nature in all its verisimilitude. Zeuxis painted grapes which
were so lifelike that birds came and began to peck at them.
Overjoyed, he thought that he had won the “mimetic” prize.
Parrhasius, on the other hand, had painted a picture of a
curtain. When Zeuxis came over to see what Parrhasius had
done, he requested that the curtain be drawn back and the
picture displayed. When he realized that he been fooled he
gestured in defeat. Whereas he had managed to deceive only
birds, Parrhasius had deceived an artist.
This story holds a special place in the development of Western art
concerning the question of mimesis, or “realism.” The capturing of an
exact mirror likeness of Nature remains a strong impulse for school-age
artists and for the “lay” public in general. Adolescents, who their peers
identify as “class artists,” are often judged by their skillful ability to render
reality “naturalistically.” Professional artists, especially illustrators, are
legitimated by their ability to draw “realistically.” Unquestionably, art
education has sought to teach such drawing skills. Kimon Nicolaïdes
(1941), whom Betty Edwards (1979) studied, provided sure ways to
draw “naturally.” Some art educators feel that constant practice is all
that is necessary. Peter London (1989), for instance, wrote, “Do you
want to draw like Rembrandt or Degas? Simple! Just draw ten hours
a day, six days a week, for forty years” (p. 16).
If art is to be “accessible” and not “avant-garde” it seems that there
has to be some transference of feeling between the viewer and what is
represented. The gestalts have to be recognizable, but not necessarily
“realistic.” Like the bird in Pliny’s story it becomes necessary for the
viewer to “peck” at the art in order to understand its meaning. The
temporal gap between an image’s effect on spectators and their response
to it must be instantaneous. The feeling of “surprise” or “delight” that
characterizes aesthetic experience is suddenly “present,” and seems to
emerge from “nowhere” (“know/where?”). In contrast, in a film or novel
we have to wait for the unfolding of the narrative in various scenes (the
moving tableaux) before the “surprises” begin to happen.
So the first lesson Pliny’s story teaches art educators is that the
connection between the image and the viewer must be, in some way,
illusionary. The image, sculpture, film, dramatic play, and so on, must
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first catch the viewer before he or she understands its meaning. An
“arrest” of movement must occur that means that the spectator believes
in what s/he sees. A suspension of disbelief is a necessary condition for
art to take its effect on us. The spectator has to be “hailed” by the work
of art; and an “interpellation” or “suture” of identity with its “world”
has to transpire (see Althusser, 1971; Silverman, 1983). However, what
is considered “illusionary” and “realistic” is a question of modality and
cultural specificity. Modality, as Hodge and Tripp (1986) have concluded
from studying children as they watched television, depends upon the
established cultural codes. In the Western perspectival world children
find the news more “realistic” or “real” and hence less illusionary than
television cartoons or spectacular action pictures. The question of
modality raises the question of the psychic distance between the viewer
and the aesthetic object. For children, the news has more of a distancing
effect than the spectacular effects of artistic illusion. When a culture,
such as Islamic fundamentalism, remains more isolated and protective
of the electronic “carpentered perspectival world” of spectacularity
(see Segall et al., 1966), the modality of what is considered “realistic”
and “illusionary” rests more on oral/aural tradition and written
orthodoxy.2
It seems that the trompe-l’oeil effects in Pliny’s story have a strong
tactile sense about them, a tangibility which hints at the possibility
that both blindness (invisibility) and seeing (visibility) somehow
come curiously together. The temporality of sequential perception, a
characteristic of the way blind people “see,”3 and space, associated with
“normal” vision, collapse as modalities in the arresting moment. Feel
and look, acting as one, characterize the fascinum (spell) as distance
vanishes. Certain sculptures or paintings “invite” touching, so much so
that the effect of the resultant “peck” becomes a question of transgression
of distance. Visitors to museums and art galleries must observe “the
do not touch” policy. The “peck” is considered to be pathological if a
2
With the introduction of the video camera and Super 8 film the grounds of
what is “realistic” and “illusionary” undergoes another shift as television series
like Top Cops and The Most Wanted attempt to provide a “realistic” portrayal of
crime. In this context “realism” is meant to act as a deterrent against crime (and,
I would suggest, inciting paranoia) keeping “illusionary” space at a distance.
This, however, is not the case with computer games where graphics “make-up”
its artistic artifice. Each generation of computer graphics are said to be more
“realistic” and “superior” to the ones before on the grounds that the child or
adolescent can become more embodied in the illusionary world that the game
provides. Children and adolescence judge their “realism” by the qualitative
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spectator actually “copy-cats” in “actual” life the aggression, violence,
rape, or killing seen especially on television and film where the technical
proficiency of reproducing the “essential copy” of “reality” are at
their height (see Bryson, 1983). Here the power of the trompe-l’oeil
effect is said to be so powerful that the “image” (and by implication
its creator) are held responsible. We need only think of Orsen Well’s
1940s radio play The War of the Worlds which caused a panic because
of its illusionary power to create the belief that aliens have landed. In
such cases art imitates life and life imitates art to the point where the
boundary between them seems indistinguishable.
It is not difficult to comprehend why modernist Kantian aesthetics,
which invests “aesthetic attitude” with a particular kind of distance
characterized by “disinterestedness,” guards against this potential fall
into “immorality.” The implications of Pliny’s story forms part of Kant’s
problematic. Kant, a pious Lutheran, in his third and final critique—The
Critique of Judgement—attempted to bridge the abyss between reason
(“pure” determinate judgments of science, the realm of necessity, the
“is”) and ethics (“pure” practical and indeterminate judgments of
morality, the realm of freedom, the “ought”) through analogies drawn
from aesthetic exemplars such as parables, allegories, and episodic
narratives. Some aesthetic objects wereob-scene. Their trompe-l’oeil effects
had no redeeming moral values whatsoever. Such art was simply all
“artifice” and trivial entertainment. Baby boomers of the Moral Right
blame television violence, punk, gangster rap and heavy metal music
(played backwards for its satanic messages) for destroying the moral fiber
of the youth. This familiar complaint stretches back to Plato’s injunction
amount of distance which vanishes when the game is being played (see also
Virilio, 1991). Ultimately this leads to the “impossible” fantasy of cyberspace
where the body has “figuratively” entered into the computer (e.g., as in Walt
Disney’s film Tron was the earliest example, now we have MUDs and virtual
communities). Metaphorically, the bird has not only pecked the grape, but has
begun to explore all the juices it has to offer! Such a cyber fantasy has a direct
bearing on the ethical question this essay is attempting to raise for art education.
Part 2 develops this further. (I would like to thank Karen Keifer-Boyd’s helpful
commentary in clarifying this difficulty between “realism” and “illusion.”)
The story about Virgil, a blind man who regained his sight after having
cataract operations on both eyes, relates the difficulties of the conflict between
sequential perception and spatial perception. This dilemma ended up being
an unresolvable conflict for him. After several years of trying to visually “see,”
Vigil became psychically blind to end his torment so that he could blindly “see”
once more. See Sacks’ (1995) chapter “To See or Not to See.”
3
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against artists for their effects of simulacra. Presumably psychic health
consists of “good” family value television (a euphemism for television
programming that is both educationally and morally proper). Listening
to Pat Boone songs and having a V-chip (a “violence” chip) installed
in one’s television set will insure psychological health. Teaching and
consuming the best works of art and literature in the schools will nurture
“good” upright and caring citizens. Such reasoning can be traced to
the most influential educator of the nineteenth century: the British
school inspector Matthew Arnold (1869). His most recent revivalists in
higher education are such figures as the late Alan Bloom (1987)., E.D.
Hirsch, Jr. (1987), Roger Kimball (1990) and Dinesh D’Souza (1991). In
art education we have Ralph Smith’s (1988) crusade for “excellence”
and the Discipline Based Art Education (DBAE) curriculum sponsored
by The Getty Center for Education in the Arts (Feinstein,1988).

Lesson 2: Theologica Moralis: Art and Evil
The deception of the trompe-l’oeil effect obviously both fascinates
(charms) and threatens, a threat which must be contained. The threat is
that of an “evil eye,” an “eye” that is capable of arresting movement and
killing life. In some stories the moment of punishment is the moment
of looking. We have only to think of the story of Sodom (Genesis, 19)
where Yahweh turns Lot’s wife into salt for looking back at Yahwah’s
destruction of the city. The gorgon Medusa in Greek mythology was
capable of turning men into stone, paralyzing them into terror when
they gazed at her face. From the Biblical injunction against worshipping
false idols, to Bernard of Clairvaux’s complaint to Abbot William that
monks were fascinated by the representations of animals and fabulous
beasts that flourished on the capitals of Romanesque cathedrals rather
than studying the text of the Bible (see Jauss, 1982), theological discourse
has always supposed the natural propensity of “man” to be “drawn in,”
deceived or be fooled by the artist’s trompe-l’oeil effects. Throughout
history, iconoclasm is a well-documented phenomenon, perhaps the
Calvinist and Islamic injunctions against “graven” images of any kind
are the severest and most puritanical examples.
From a Biblical point of view the question of the trompe-l’oeil is
heavily coded by moral injunctions. There is no “good eye” in the Old
or New Testament (Lacan, 1979, p. 119). It is always maleficient. The
lust for sex and being caught by the pornographic image underpins
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the allegory of “man’s” fall from God’s grace. Sex remains demonic.
Like the bird in Pliny’s story the male uncontrollably “pecks” at the
female in a “natural” state of hysterical sexual frenzy. It requires little
theoretical effort to see how the sensuousness of the material body, rather
than the soul or the mind, is coded as being evil, its lot cast with the
animal kingdom in its inability to participate in higher transcendental
realms. The ontology of the medieval “Great Chain of Being” (Lovejoy,
1978) hierarchically ordered the animals in their possible relation to the
transcendental spirit of God. Slithering on the bottom was, of course,
the snake which transports us to the allegory of the Garden of Eden.
This debased and lowest of creatures, perhaps first associated with
goddess worship as a symbol of phallic control (e.g., in predynastic
Egypt a picture of a cobra was the hieroglyph for the word Goddess,
see Stone, 1976), is evil personified, prompting the woman to use her
body to lure man into sin which formed the stain that “mared” the
purity of God’s light by the reddish glow of the apple’s bite. Adam and
Eve must struggle against Nature in order to survive as Adam and Eve
are cast out of the illusionary, symbiotic, and fantasmatic relationship
with God to fend for themselves.
There is yet another aspect to the allegory of the Garden which
again brings up the question of sight. When Adam and Eve face God
they do not lack. They seem completely under His watchful eye, an
originary trompe-l’oeil effect where only His gaze is beneficent. Having
“sinned,” however, they fall out of His “grace,” and consequently
must face the “evil” outside the Garden. Now as incomplete creatures
Adam and Eve must face the “imagos of the[ir] fragmented body” (Lacan,
1977, p. 11), e.g.,
images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment,
dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of
the body. One only has to listen to children aged between
two and five playing, alone or together, to know that the
pulling off of the head and the ripping open of the belly
are themes that occur spontaneously to their imagination,
and that this is corroborated by the experience of the doll
torn to pieces. (ibid.)

Children engage in acts of sadism and masochism—hate and
pain (e.g., as temper tantrums and crying) when society fails to meet
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their needs and demands. They are frustrated by being uncoordinated
and not “whole.” Emotions of both love (pleasure and the life drive)
and hate (reality and the death drive) emerge as children struggle to
preserve and maintain themself.4 As newly born children, Adam and
Eve possess an ontological aggressiveness. There is a voracious aspect
of their sight that is marked by “evil.” The eye has consumptive scopic
desires. To be whole and complete, their eye (metonymic for the self as
I) is capable of an “evil look” in its thirst to survive and possess some
Thing that will make it complete and satisfied. Evil, which is another
name for the “death-drive” in Freud’s system, is ontologically before
the Good, and in this sense “radical” (see Zizek, 1993).5 We could say it
is the “original stain of nature,” that is, the Christian concept, “original
sin.” By way of evil, “man” wrests himself from animal instinctual
rhythms, that is, “he” overcomes the dominion of pathological natural
impulses. In other words it is Evil that enables man to free himself from
the “nature” which “he” shares with animals. Evil as the death drive
“installs” the system of pleasure. It makes way for the Good! “Man’s”
originary choice is not between Good and Evil as oppositions, rather
it is between the pathology of Being (our animalness) and radical Evil
(overcoming it).

Lesson 3: The Moment of Blindness as Objet a
What has all this to do with our discussion concerning art
education? It seems that certain forms of hyperviolence, i.e., in particular
aestheticized violence which appeals only to ethical indifference and
consumptive gratitiude, require more than a hysterical reactionary
response by self-appointed moral guardians of society. The aesthetics
of specularity in the media and the continued commercialization of the
arts should give art educators pause to rethink “visual literacy” in this
postmodernist era. “Visual literacy” involves more than the outdated
understandings of perception (Rudolf Arnheim for instance). It requires
a recognition that unconscious fantasy permeates all our conscious

4
Space does not allow me to elaborate on the importance of the “death
instinct” as a second-order principle which governs, founds, or “installs” the
pleasure principle which governs our psychic life where we systematically
seek pleasure and avoid pain. This is brilliantly articulated in comprehensible
language by Gilles Deleuze in his chapter “The Death Instinct” (1991).
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life. I have noted that the trompe-l’oeil effect is considered “evil” and a
threat, as well as a seduction. From the psychoanalytic point of view,
it shows the subject’s lack of presence because the image’s potential
to mislead and deceive the eye seemingly happens without mediation
and modification. The transaction appears “causal,” i.e., as a natural
and unrestrained response.
The second part of Pliny’s story, which involves the curtain as
trompe-l’oeil presents a different scenario. The eye is “taken in” only
momentarily. The entire aesthetic effect depends on the eventual
recognition that the painting is illusionism rather than illusion, as
Mitchell (1994) argues. To deceive a human being, as Parrhasios makes
clear, is to present the spectator with a painting of a curtain or “veil”
(linteum). What incites Zeuxis is not the veil per se, but what was
“behind” it—which was precisely nothing! Lacan (1979) reads Pliny’s
story as an illustration of unconscious “desire.” It was the seduction of
Zeuxis’ desire that did him in. What attracts and satisfies a spectator in a
trompe-l’oeil is a moment when, by a mere shift in the gaze, the spectator
is able to realize that the representation does not move with the gaze,
but indeed is merely a trompe-l’oeil. The picture does not compete with
“reality” per se, but with what is beyond appearance. Lacan reads this
“beyond” as objet petit a—the fascinatory element introduced by the
gaze—which, in psychoanalytic parlance, is the desire to be complete
and whole. One’s lack is filled by the fascinatory object. A successful
work of art that the artist or student either consumes or produces is
one which satisfies this lack. It provides psychic satisfaction and makes
one feel more “alive.” It is here that the pedagogical task for the art
educator becomes difficult, since “visual literacy” in this sense is an art
education based on this “blind spot” of desire. Let me try to explain
what is at stake here by returning to the Pliny story.
Paradoxically, in a painting that has momentarily “caught” the

5
The ontological system that is being questioned here is (again) the modernist ethic proposed by Kant. Following the work of Slavoj Zizek, Joan Copjec
and Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy, 1993) the claim is that Kant was unable to accommodate and account for the question of “radical evil” in his system. “Radical
evil” is the exception that deconstructs his systemic ethics based on reason.
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spectator into its lure (its labyrinth of meaning) there is a blind spot or
absence present in the central field of the picture. This is what Zeuxis
does not “see” but desires. It is what he is “blind” to. In other words,
every representation contains within itself a metaphorical “vanishing
point” which indicates the limit of the field of vision and consciousness,
just as there is always a vanishing point on the horizon of our field
of perception. It is this point, or limit which can be equated with
Lacan’s notion of objet a. Objet a is what “frames” vision psychically,
not perceptually. It is removed from the field of visual reality which
frames it. A slightly modified diagram introduced by Jacques-Alain
Miller, Lacan’s foremost practitioner, as it appears in Zizek (1992, p.
94), demonstrates this framing of visual experience.

We see here that objet a frames our psychic Imaginary “vision.”
Lacan made a distinction between the eye and the gaze. The eye (or the
look) stands for the geometrical, visual grammar of the current historical
hyperconventional “realism” (art as mimesis or versimilitude in Pliny’s
case), and the gaze stands for the subject’s position within this grammar.
Whereas the eye (look) represents the conscious, self-reflective subject
of knowledge or cogito, the desiring subject of the gaze leads us to the
unconscious desire for an unknown object which in Lacanian parlance
is (once more) objet a. The objet a is something separate from the subject,
that which the subject lacks to constitute itself as psychically “whole”
or complete. Lacan argues that the primordial objet a of satisfaction is
the mother’s breast.
The blind spot (objet a) which appears in the hallucinatory mirror
after the initial suture into the picture, represents the limitation of
the subject’s consciousness. Objet a, where Zeuxis’ directed his gaze,
has no specular image, no visibility, and represents the other side of
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vision and consciousness. It belongs to the unconscious, and forms the
“cause” of desire. Recognizing that such desire ensnared him, evoked a
“smile” (“delight,” “surprise”) from Zeuxis when he realized his own
expectatins had fooled him. The imagined object of his own desire
had “framed” him. In other words, his gaze became inverted and
( )Based on the illusion of seeing only a mirror
directed back at himself.
of reality (as represented by the veil where there is no blind spot), to
the moment when he realizes that he and his surprise are the object
of Parrhasius’ gaze its blind spot has now appeared. The gaze of the
Other (e.g., Parrhasius) decenters his vision. Zeuxis is no longer the eye
(“I”) of consciousness seeing what he wants to see. Rather he is seen in
a way that he may not want to be seen (self-consciously with “egg” on
his face). His initial illusion was broken when he “downcast” his eyes.
The “true” nature of envy presents itself in such a gesture. As Lacan
(1979) remarks, “invidia [envy] comes from videre,” to see (p. 115). It
is triggered when someone gazes at someone else who—seemingly—
possesses objet a, and is, therefore, complete and satisfied, for example,
when a little child sees his younger brother at his mother’s breast. Envy
here is not jealousy, nor is it directed at possessing a particular object
(the child who looks at his younger brother does not want to possess
the breast). Rather, it is directed at the illusion that someone else is
whole and complete. In Zeuxis case that Parrhasius might be fullfilled
by possessing objet a. The lesson Lacan teaches us here is that desire is
the desire of the Other.
The curtain or veil is identified by Lacan as a particular kind of
trompe-l’oeil which he playfully calls a “dompe-regard . . . the taming,
civilizing, and charming power of the function of the picture” (1979,
pp. 111; 116). A dompe-regard evokes “downcasts” eyes. It is, therefore,
a turn to the “good.” Zeuxis recognizes that he has been “framed.” But
this “frame” had to preceed his moment of “knowledge” in order to
“tame” his envious gaze. Zeuxis had to avert his gaze and admit failure.
By perceiving what was non-perceivable within himself (the blind spot
as the “nothing” behind the veil), Zeuxis provides an exemplary case for
the West’s lesson of coming to grips with desire of the Other—an ethical
act which refers to the interrogation of one’s own response to Things in
relation to the Other. Animals are not capable of doing although humans
share with them an Imaginary realm. An oscillation between illusion and
illusion-ism has to take place if such an ethics is to succeed. The power of
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the image has to be continually overcome. The “good” becomes defined
as the overcoming of deceptive appearances. These could include the
“lure” of advertising, ideology critique, pornography, and of course,
exposing the panoptic surveillance of a spectacular society. The paradox
of the artist in such an ontological position is that s/he must work with
the arrestment of life and the movement of the self as a way to “ward
off” the evil eye. Art becomes a moral endeavor. While banning and
pacifying the evil eye, painting formally relies on its arresting function.
Both movement and arrest form the dialectic of painting, as the paradox
of the constancy of change itself.6 Every work of art must necessarily be
an act of failure, or, perhaps a momentary victory, in the sense that art
can never satisfy fully and completely psychic wholeness. One thinks
here of such industrious artists as Giacometti whose search to find
the “human essence” after uncountable attempts was, in this sense, a
failure. Giacometti shows us that there is also the danger of becoming so
obsessed with a Thing, that the Thing can begin to devour the artist. In
other words, the artist, like the spectator is no less immune to the threat
of trompe-l’oeil which constitutes an undoing of the psychical defenses.
Such ob-session, like something which is ob-scene, indicates crossing a
boundary into a perverse and psychotic world (next lesson).

Lesson 4: When the World Stares Back
Objects Possess Us!

and

In some moments we have what might be properly called psychotic
experiences, when that which is “normally” invisible to us in our
everyday perception, reveals itself. These are moments when “objects”
stare back at us, as if they possessed the gaze. Rather than being in control
of our own gaze, at moments objet a appears to peer at us. We may
have auditory hallucinations. (For example, Norman’s mother’s voice
in Hitchcock’s Psycho.) These are typically uncanny, unnerving, anxiety
ridden moments when the unconscious non-perception “speaks.” We
sometimes experience a flash of the phenomenon when we gaze at
the mirror but don’t recognize ourselves. The uncanny evokes an odd
moment of anxiety. There are experiences that make us feel as though
we are gazed at when no one is there. Art objects, especially films, can
show us what we don’t want to see by forcing their gaze back upon
us. In other words, paradoxically, we vanish as subjects when such
objects “eat” us up as in David Cronenberg’s biography of Edgar Rice
Bourrough, Naked Lunch (Thomas & Cronenberg, 1991). The presence
of objet a constitutes the threat—the undoing of a psychical defense—
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causing a split or division within ourselves (written as $, Lacan’s symbol
for the split-subject of desire). We are suddenly self-exposed when we
recognize that we are seen “being seen.” Freud (1923/1961) captured
such dread and horror through his examination of the German word
Unheimlich (frightening, eerie, sinister) which is related to Heimlich that
has the ambivalent meaning of either homely and familiar, or hidden
and secret. The un of Unheimlich marks the return of repressed material.
We can say that what is Heimlich belongs to the “look,” visibility, and the
symbolic order of language, while Unheimlich belongs to the gaze, objet
a, the imaginary order, and the unconscious. William Blake’s visions
present a paradigmatic example of such perverse perception. Kandinsky
(1964) ofters a more “modern” example of such animistic perception
when he wrote, “Everything ‘dread’ trembled. Not only the stars, moon,
woods, flowers of which the poets sing, but also the cigarette butt in the
ashtray . . . everything shows me its face, its innermost being; its secret
soul, which is more often silent than heard” (pp. 23-24).
The familiarity (Heimlich) of art which is regulated by intentionality
and a centered point-of-view, the “eye” or I of consciousness, can act as
a screen against such moments. When art is familiar it appears harmless
(less harmful). This explains the strong impulse for realism in the arts
by young people and adults alike. The (over)emphasis on “beauty”
and properly distanced realism, represses the fear of the sublime as the
uncanny “evil” eye, and provides a “normal” perception which centers
a coherent subject-spectator rather than decenters vision in which the
“world,” or Big Other, is gazing at you—panoptically and scopophillicly
(i.e., vouyeristically). Masks, puppets, and ventriloquism, which projects
the voice “elsewhere,” provide a mediation from this panoptic gaze
and voice.7 These are forms of a homeopathic or prophylactic “eye”
which enable us to effectively deal with this potentially psychotic
“worldly” gaze which exists everywhere and nowhere. Realistic art
participates in the dompte-regard as a process of taming and reassuring
our normal perception. Like masks, realism in representation requires
that the spectator adopt the stance of the fetishist. Fetishism requires
that we undertake a simultaneous acceptance and denial of what
we see. We believe that what is represented reflects the real world,
yet at the same time, we recognize that the representation is only a
6
Lacan who was a good friend of Merleau-Ponty drew many of his examples
of art from him and, of course, Surrealists like René Magritte. Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of perception and his interest in Cézanne were Lacan’s points
of departure.
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representation. Fetishism in this sense is a psychically “healthy” response
for “normative” perception. The fetishistic cult object of indigenous
peoples, such as a talisman, acts as a “counter-eye” to guard against
evil. In psychoanalytic theory, fetishism, as the binding together of belief
and knowledge, acts as a defense against castration which signifies to
the subject his/her own emptiness—that is, the fundamental splitting
of subjectivity ($) as ideal ego (the look) and ego ideal (the gaze). But
the trompe-l’oeil can produce an uncanny effect, a hyperbolization of
positioning the spectator in a situation in whichthere is a separation
between belief and knowledge. The contradiction between these two
events becomes more apparent as the gap between the Imaginary and
the Symbolic registers in the conscious mind. For the trompe-l’oeil to
“work,” there has to be a “delay” in the knowledge that seems real is
indeed artifice. The longer the interval between illusion and illusionism
, the more anxiety, fright, and horror the spectator can feel. This seems
to be particularly the case within the horror genre.
A disturbing example in this regard is the 1993 Belgium film Man
Bites Dog , directed and written by three film students: Remy Belvraux,
Andre Bonzel and Benoit Poetvoorde. Shot in black and white in the
style of a documentary, it recounts the story of several film students
who wish to document a psychopathic killer. As the story proceeds they
become implicated in the killings, and the psychopath eventually kills
the camera crew. The spectator is never certain whether these events
were staged or real. The experience is as repulsive as a “snuff” film
in which a “real” victim is tortured, raped, maimed, shot, and killed.
There is no “acting” involved. The filmmakers of Man Bites Dog seem
to have consciously eschewed acting. The disturbance of its effects are
increased by the sheer “ordinariness” of the actors. No one in the film
is “recognizable” or famous enough to indicate to the viewer that this
is all artifice. The moment of illusionism never comes. The spectator
remains “locked” - trapped - in its illusion, which is a profoundly
disturbing experience. Such films are “rare.” It is obviously this fear that
Boomer moralists are reacting against, although they target violence
indiscriminately, since they are unable to articulate their unease easily.

I am not developing aspects of the voice which forms another object a in
Lacan’s system, the mother’s voice being its originary function. This is merely
to recognize its power here. See Silverman’s (1992) “Fassbinder and Lacan: A
reconsideration of gaze, look and image” for an understandable account for
the gaze in its capacity as society’s Big Other.
7
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The violence of a film such as Man Bites Dog is “too real”—“too close.”
When it loses its fetishistic, i.e., its artificial “staged” effect, the eyes
cannot “blink” and become downcast or averted. Cinema in the moral
reactionary’s view, ought to act as an institutionalized control of the
effects of trompe-l’oeil. Art’s dompte-regard is supposed to teach us the
moral lessons which surround our desires; to make the invisible visible
in Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) turn of phase, and to help us perceive the
imperceptible. This has been the West’s legacy: the triumph of rationality
over our emotions and passions; the repression of the demons that come
at us out of the sublime as a way to face the amorality of nature. Pliny’s
account of the illusion of realism, taken in its broader context (see Mitchell,
1994), was for the greater progress of the political economy of Athens.
The public function of “realistic” art, by such artists as Apollodorus,
Timanthes, Androcydes, Eupompus, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, was its
role in political propaganda and mass spectacle, as means to propagate
noble genealogy. But this was not all. Pliny’s recounting of the story
compared the superiority of humans over animals in their ability to
overcome the illusions that captured them. Rather than being enslaved
by the image, Pliny argued that humans could become self-conscious,
as they become aware that a mere image had “taken them in.” With
the proper distance such freedom could be achieved from the power of
illusions that arrested their attention. Interpellation by the image could
be overcome through criticism, ideology critique and demystification,
a long standing agenda for educators of the Left.

Concluding Lesson: The Hidden Binaries
Having justified why art education should continue to both pursue
the fetishization of objects (as forms of realism) as well as continually
break the spells of trompe-l’oeil so as to achieve the “right” Kantian
distance and avoid the pathology of psychosis, there is of course,
something very “wrong” and troubling with this modernist endeavor.
I will conclude with a discussion of some of these troubling issues.
Pliny’s story sets up a self/other binary in which the first hierarchy
is between animals and humans. Humans can overcome their animal
nature, animals can not overcome theirs. A strong anthropocentrism
asserts itself, one which John Berger (1980) identifies as standing for all
forms of otherness: class, race, sex and gender. Not only have animals
become throughout history progressively more and more marginalized,
but race, sex, gender and class are represented by images of subhuman
brutishness, bestial appetite, and mechanical servility. This is one side of
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the anthropocentrism which has displaced God with Man at the apex of
Modernism’s inversion of the “Great Chain of Being.” We must rethink
the question of nature’s animism from the perspective of an ecological
consciousness and a green aesthetics (jagodzinski, 1987, 1992). The
sublime sense of nature is coded as evil both in scientific and theological
discourse. From this yet another self/other binary reproduces itself as
the West and the “Rest.” The Western eye presents a division between
an animistic art which is caught up with vision quests and in which
one seeks guidance from the spirit world (see Highwater, 1981), and
a rationalism that represses such “monsters” (not spirits). Do we then
follow Freud (1923/1961) in his claim that archaic animistic knowledge
is more “primitive”? that, before the advent of scientific rationalism
the world was more “psychotic”? and that the West is therefore more
“progressive”?
There is yet another self/other binary at work here which is
every bit as fundamental as the other two, and this is the recognition
that for the masculine subject, woman is the trompe-l’oeil par excellent.
First, and perhaps most obviously, is that males have viewed women
as closer to Nature than they are. She lactates, menstruates, gives birth
to children, socializes (tames) them, and “services” the body through
such nurturing actives as cooking the meals and looking after the
Heim (house) (see Ortner, 1974). Further, she is the one who wears
the mask (the masquerade of make-up), which, on the one hand is her
“lure,” and also a sign that she needs more “protection.” More frail
and susceptible than her male counterpart (recall the Garden scene)
she is less rational. Perceptually, according to psychologists like Witkin
(1949/50), she is said to be more “field dependent” than men who are
“field independent.” In other words, the lures of the environment ensnare
her. This view supposes that women are less analytical than men, e.g.,
that they can not read maps, and only tell men drivers “where to go”
(pun intended). Accordingly, the brain of women is said to be wired
differently. Psychosexual brain differences put her “spatial imagination”
at a big disadvantage (see Fausto-Sterling, 1985 for rebuttals). Being
“field dependent” she is suspect to the trompe-l’oeil effects and in the
Imaginary register.8 Although she dwells in the same “house” (Heim)
as man she is always a threat. Her “mask” (masquerade) can change
as the “virgin mother” turns into a she-devil by simply applying “too”
much make-up and changing her looks. This is a familiar cinematic
trope (e.g., recently played out in Renny Harlin’s film, The Long Kiss
Goodnight). She can arouse dread and horror as the “phallic Mother.”
Like Medusa, she can turn a man to stone. Everything that is coded as
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feminine, as “body,” loses distance and the right moral attitude since
the masculine and the feminine are “incomplete selves” who are locked
together by lack and desire.9 The West’s concept of art privileges the
spectator as masculine (the distance of knowledge) and the image as
feminine (the closeness of belief). If we are to believe the controversial
Paglia (1990) the Western contemplative, conceptual eye of art was born
in Egypt (p. 50). Since that time the conflict of identity has remained, as
Nietzche described it, a struggle of a will-to-power between the forces
of Dionysus and Apollo.1 0 Lacan (1992) in his seminar on ethics in the
60s developed the concept of the “sinthome” as that which gives the
subject its ontological consistency. Zizek (1992) writes that the “sinthome
is a psychotic kernel that can neither be interpreted (as symptom) nor
‘traversed’ (as fantasy)—what can we do with it, then?” he asks, “Lacan’s
answer is to identify with the sinthome” (p. 137). Man’s Western Eye
has been unable to identify with its sublime Other. In other words, its
inability to face that which it fears most, that which provides it with
its very identity.

* * *
The uncanny (or umheimlich) has become an important
consideration in postmodern aesthetic because it acts as a challenge to
representation—to the acquiescence of fetishism per se. It provides the
potential to make us see the world not as ready-made for our description,
depiction, and portrayal. Rather it presents it in a constant process
of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction. The success of
recent television shows, such as The X Files, Millennium and Dark Skies
, among young viewers is an indication that they are fascinated with
the uncertainty of the times. The sublime remains the Other in Kant’s
aesthetic of beauty. A working through the West’s realistic repression of
the sublime can downcast the eye in yet another way. When it can not
bear to look—but must face its own evil—art tavels upon a road that is
perhaps too dangerous for the classroom (and Hollywood) because of
the clanging heard by moral Boomers outside classroom doors. Disney
Productions seems driven to satiate the Western eye until it becomes
ob-ese, dripping with mawkish sentimentality. Certainly opening up
Pandora’s Box to explore repressed perversities provides little economic
rewards when compared with the reproductive, consumptive hegemony
of realism and its presumption of an innocent, transparent image.
What I have in mind can be illustrated by a scene and a film by two
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director-explorers of the postmodern sublime—the two David’s—Lynch
and Cronenberg—one American, the other Canadian. Both investigate
the repressed image and interrogate it rather than preserve it. Radical
evil is pushed to the point where it reverses itself into moral revelation.
David Lynch in Wild At Heat presents a rape fantasy so “close” to the
surface that it answers to the patriarchal “she made me do it” by making
the scene/seen so painful to watch that the audience is left squirming in
their seats1 1 (Montgomery & Lynch, 1990). In a lonely run-down motel
room in the middle of nowhere, William Defoe asserts unrelenting
pressure on Laura Dern to yield to his desires. He touches and squeezes
her, invading her space of intimacy and says “fuck me, fuck me” over
and over again. The ugly scene drags on to the point where we see Dern
slowly surrendering to his suggestions. The camera pans to her clenched
hand which slowly opens up in compliance as she faintly answers “yes.”
The audience is released from any more pain when Defoe makes an
about face and says, “No thanks. Not today. I’ve to go.” What makes
the scene/seen so excruciating and excessively cruel is the realization
that Dern has been psychically and not physically raped. Her secret
desire to be brutally raped, the very kernel of her being, has been stirred
up, and exposed. This makes the rape excessively humiliating, and, in
turn, stretches the gap of illusion to a point where the audience can no
longer bear to watch the exposure of Dern’s secret.
On the same register of the sublime, is David Cronenberg’s recent

8
It should be pointed out that there is the object relations theory of
feminist psychoanalysis like Nancy Chodrow (1978) and an entire movement
of feminist gynocriticism (predominately lesbian) in literature and art which
supports such an assumption (see Frueh, Langer, & Raven, 1994). In this view
the essence of femininity and hence woman is to be found in the imaginary
pre-Oedipal register where daughters are still attached to their mothers. From
a Lacanian feminist position, e.g., Constance Penley, Jacqueline Rose, Ellie
Ragland-Sullivan such essentialism oversimplifies the Oedipal difficulties
which sex/gender present.
9
Here I wish to avoid setting up a hetero/homo binary. Following Lacan’s
logic in his ‘formulae of sexuation’ (1982) masculine and feminine represent
‘logical’ positions. A gay or lesbian couple, like a hetero couple, are split into
masculine and feminine positions.
10
More radical feminists like Mary Daly (1978) claim that this opposition
does not go far enough. Dionysus and Apollo are “two faces of the same god”
(p.64). She claims that Dionysus is Zeus in his young form. “Dionysus was in
fact his own father” (ibid.).
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movie Crash, based on J. G. Ballard’s novel about sex and car crashes
(Thomas, Lantos, & Cronenberg, 1996). The viewer can comprehend the
movie when one recognizes that the characters in the story are already
“dead.” Pleasure turned into pain can only be understood by making the
death-drive present. These characters stare evil in the face, and we are
asked to stare with them—if we can. The images are far from alluring
and erotic. Sex is presented in a desexualized fashion—as a drive (Trieb),
as a need or a demand that is not caught up in the dialectics of desire.
Sex and metal come together, even more debased and void of spirit
than any animal. Hard. Cold. Voices show no emotion. Their bodies are
wedded to metal prosthetically, sometimes to the car itself. They present
the antithesis of transnational capitalist fantasy of cyberspace as the
disappearance of the body and the cyborgs it breeds. This is the pain of
technology gone awry, in which the car crashes of Jayne Mansfield and
James Dean are revered as heroic and iconic exemplars of the suicidal
road kill of 50s America (mis)perceived Other—Hollywood’s leading
ladies and delinquent youth. The reply to the current Boomer nostalgia
should be obvious.
On that happy note, I appropriately end this essay on the 31st of
October, 1996. Halloween. Trick or Treat?
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